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Abstract
This case study examines barriers to entry in retail banking in South Africa, informed 
by Capitec’s experiences as an entrant in this concentrated and highly regulated 
sector. Capitec’s entry and growth in transactional banking sparked a competitive 
response from incumbents. Across all four incumbent banks, the fees for low-cost 
accounts have come down in nominal terms. It is unlikely that these effects would 
have occurred if the status quo had continued without a disruptive entrant, or if 
Capitec had been acquired by one of the incumbents early on. Capitec overcame 
barriers to entry including customers’ reluctance to switch, complex regulation, and 
the largely self-regulated payments system, in order to grow, in a sector populated by 
incumbents with some market power. The case study considers measures that could 
lower barriers for future entrants.
Keywords
competition, barriers to entry, digital technology advances, retail banking, Capitec 
Bank, South Africa
Recommended citation
Makhaya, T., & Nhundu, N. (2016). Competition, barriers to entry and inclusive 
growth in retail banking: Capitec case study. The African Journal of Information and 
Communication (AJIC), 17, 111-137.
This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
1  The article draws on research supported by the National Treasury of South Africa and the 
University of Johannesburg. The views expressed are those of the authors alone. 
112 AJIC Thematic Issue: Economic Regulation, Regulatory Performance and Universal Access 
in the Electronic Communications Sector
 Makhaya and Nhundu
1. Introduction
This article examines a case study of a new entrant building capabilities and 
engaging in competitive rivalry in a concentrated market with high barriers to 
entry, namely retail banking in South Africa. The case study provides insights into 
business model innovations, including the usage of digital technologies that allowed 
Capitec to navigate market power and emerge as an important participant in the 
market, albeit one that still holds a relatively low market share. The study relied on 
interviews with retail banks (Capitec Bank, Mercantile Bank, Ubank); regulators 
and policymakers (Payment Association of South Africa (PASA), South African 
Reserve Bank National Payment System Department and Banking Supervision 
Department, National Treasury); research institutes (Solidarity Research Institute, 
FinMark Trust, Moody’s); the Banking Association; Thutuka (payments processor); 
and, PSG Investment Bank (PSG). Secondary research included a review of banks’ 
annual reports, industry reports and the Competition Commission’s Banking Enquiry 
(Competition Commission of South Africa, 2008). The study aims to provide lessons 
for policymakers on how to craft the kinds of policy and regulation that promote 
competition and that may enable market entry.
A notable feature of Capitec’s strategy is its use of digital technology to develop a 
low-cost banking offering that appeals to mass-market consumers. The bank built 
an electronic platform that removed paper transactions and simplified operations in 
the branch. This was a departure from the typical banking experience, which involves 
complex forms and processes that intimidate newly banked customers (interview with 
FinMark Trust, 17 June 2015). The study shows how this use of digital technology 
has enabled Capitec to compete against the incumbents, particularly at the lower end 
of the market.
It is well established that there are barriers to entry in network industries (Armstrong, 
2005; Motta, 2004; Rochet & Tirole, 2003). Consumers tend to be sticky in not readily 
switching between providers, as a result of the associated inconveniences and “lock-
in” features of network services. This implies that such industries are concentrated 
and firms have market power. Studies of the South African banking industry have 
confirmed the significantly high levels of concentration with C4 concentration 
ratios of over 80% (Bikker, Shaffer & Spierdijk, 2012; Simatele, 2015; Simbanegavi, 
Greenberg & Gwatidzo, 2014). The studies have also identified monopolistically 
competitive behaviour and suggested that attention needs to be paid to increasing 
levels of competitive rivalry. This highlights the importance of understanding, in 
greater detail, the nature of entry barriers and the benefits from successful entry and 
increased rivalry, of which Capitec is the best exemplar. 
Barriers to entry in retail banking are largely a product of sunk costs, related economies 
of scale, regulation and the need for interoperability (Motta, 2004; O’Donoghue & 
Padilla, 2006). To offer a basic transaction service, which competes with at least the 
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minimum product package offered by incumbents, requires IT systems, a branch 
and automated teller machine (ATM) network, and brand-building expenditures 
(Autoriteit Consument & Markt, 2014, p. 15; Dick, 2007; Office of Fair Trading, 
2010, p. 63). Most of these outlays are sunk investments, which cannot be recovered 
in case of failure. Retail banking relies extensively on technology, and consumers 
have come to expect digital solutions that allow easy management of bank accounts, 
transparency and speedy access to services (Govender & Wu, 2013; Maduku, 2013; 
PwC, 2012). Product differentiation between banks is influenced by technological 
choices and capabilities (Competition Commission, 1998, p. 63; interview with 
FinMark Trust, 17 June 2015). 
The intrinsic nature of the industry provides the basis for strategic activity by 
incumbents, to further raise obstacles to entrants, such as those related to consumer 
switching costs, which obstacles can increase the expenditures required on marketing 
and the time period over which these costs can be recouped (Church & Ware, 
2000; O’Donoghue & Padilla, 2006). There are substantial entry costs associated 
with regulations, including the cost of obtaining a banking licence and the related 
authorisations; the basic cost of compliance; and the need to maintain a certain level of 
regulatory capital, whose type and quality is usually specified in law. Such regulations 
are naturally important. However, it is important to consider how regulations are 
designed and implemented. Entrants also need to access the national payments 
system and enter into bilateral and/or multilateral arrangements with established 
incumbents (Competition Commission of South Africa, 1998, p. 55). 
The most important regulatory body for retail banking in South Africa is the Reserve 
Bank2, through its Banking Supervision and National Payment Systems divisions. 
The South African Reserve Bank has delegated the management of the payment 
system to the Payment Association of South Africa (PASA). Other regulatory bodies 
governing retail banking include the Financial Intelligence Centre, tasked with 
combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and related activities; 
the National Credit Regulator, which oversees lending to retail customers; and the 
Financial Services Board, which oversees the banks. Efforts at self-regulation are 
carried out under the auspices of the Banking Association, which has produced a 
voluntary Code of Banking that outlines the minimum standards of service that a 
bank must extend to its customers.3 
2  The role of the Reserve Bank is set to change with the introduction of a new regulatory regime 
dubbed “twin peaks”. In this new model, the prudential regulation of banks will be separated from the 
regulation of market conduct. The latter is likely to be performed by a unit outside the Reserve Bank 
whose mandate includes promoting competition in retail banking.
3  The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa does not have any direct role in 
regulating retail banks, save for their activities as mobile virtual network operators.
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2. Market power and barriers to entry in retail banking in South Africa
The retail banking sector is that part of the financial services industry that is concerned 
with providing transactional services (payments), credit, savings and other financial 
intermediation and advisory services to individual consumers and small businesses. 
Over 85% of the share of retail deposits is accounted for by the “big four” banks 
namely those that trade as Barclays Africa (ABSA), Standard Bank, First National 
Bank and Nedbank (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Market share of retail household deposits, 2011-2014
Source: Capitec (2014), based on South African Reserve Bank data
The issue of market power in South African retail banking has been traversed in 
a few studies (Alves, 2011; Competition Commission of South Africa, 2008; 
Hawthorne, Goga, Sihin & Robb, 2014). Notably, the Competition Commission’s 
Banking Enquiry Panel engaged with the matter extensively in its final report. The 
enquiry report defined market power as “the ability of a firm to charge prices above 
those that would prevail under competitive conditions” (Competition Commission 
of South Africa, 2008, p. 34). The Banking Enquiry Panel found that, in the market 
for personal transactional accounts (PTAs), established banks enjoyed market power 
derived from various factors. Retail banking was characterised by economies of scale, 
which make it difficult for medium-sized businesses to compete in the market. High 
fixed and common costs underpin market concentration. The banks are characterised, 
in the report, as avoiding price competition as far as was possible, but competing 
on other dimensions. The Panel argued that the banks were taking advantage of 
various mechanisms to lock customers in to a particular banking institution. The 
Panel found that differentiated products and complicated pricing structures allowed 
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banks to remain highly profitable. Banks’ power is also aided by the costs of switching 
that customers incur when changing banks. The recommendations made by the 
Banking Enquiry Panel to improve competition in retail banking have been partly 
implemented, in particular the determination of interchange fees between banks by 
an independent party, the lowering of penalty fees for low income customers and 
increased transparency in banking charges (Hawthorne et al., 2014).
Banking Enquiry Panel recommendations on customer switching
The Panel recommended that the following be included in the Code of Banking 
Practice: standardisation of terminology; a requirement to communicate in 
“plain language”; the provision of minimum information on bank statements and 
information on charges on every account; advanced notice of new and altered charges; 
and a regular rights reminder (Competition Commission of South Africa, 2008, pp. 
498-506). Furthermore the Panel outlined other recommendations that were meant 
to improve information mobility, as well as easy the switching process, including 
creation of generic banking profiles by the Banking Association to ease comparisons 
between products; establishment of a central banking fee calculator; abolishment of 
comparative advertising restrictions; the creation of a code of switching practice;4 
and a central Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) hub to ease switching5 
(Competition Commission of South Africa, 2008, p. 500).
National Treasury (2010) issued a press statement, following engagement with the 
banking industry, in which it was announced that the recommendations above would 
be implemented, but at the discretion of the banks. The Code of Banking Practice 
was revised in 2012 to effect these changes. Recommendations related to easing the 
comparability of products were not taken forward. It was argued that the creation of 
generic profiles would risk collusion. Customer profiles and a centralised calculator 
were not implemented. Though detailed guidelines on switching have been added to 
the Code of Banking Practice, customers are still liable for any charges or penalties 
that may arise during the process.
Banking Enquiry Panel recommendations on the payments system
The structure, functioning and governance of the payments system also present 
a barrier to entry in retail banking. Only banks are allowed to participate in the 
payment system as settlement and clearing agents. The Banking Enquiry Panel made 
an extensive range of recommendations related to the governance of the payment 
system and the pricing of inter-bank arrangements. The Panel also raised concerns 
4  It would include criteria on the provision of information and documentation, a schedule setting 
out the terms on which banks were to provide each other with documentation and in terms of which 
transfers were to take place. It would allow for customers to be exempt from paying fees that are due 
to failures in the switching process. 
5  This has not been implemented because of lack of clarity about which bank bears responsibility for 
breaches of the law.
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about the level of price competition for ATM services. It identified two causes 
of market power in the provision of ATM cash dispensing services. The first was 
interbank pricing arrangements, which the Panel argued inhibited price competition. 
The second arose because only registered banks could acquire these services.
To implement the Panel’s recommendations, banks agreed to: provide a detailed 
breakdown of fees and charges on bank statement; display a message on ATM screens 
where customers are to be charged an additional fee for ATM usage; and review the 
policy of cash back at POS - which is now offered by banks at participating retailers. 
The Reserve Bank is implementing a multi-phase interchange determination project, 
which resulted in new ATM fees being set. However, the process does not allow for 
public scrutiny of the methodology or input from non-banks (Hawthorne et al., 
2014).
The Panel raised some concerns about barriers to entry and competition in the 
payments system: Banks were gatekeepers into the payments system (only banks 
could become members of the Payments Association of South Africa (PASA), 
giving them power to supervise their non-bank competitors and entrants); the path 
to move from a non-clearing bank to a clearing bank was not set out clearly and the 
process was time-consuming; innovation would have to conform to the preferences 
and business imperatives of clearing banks and the payment clearing house, placing 
potential limits on innovations by non-banks; Bankserv Africa’s pricing practices 
could be problematic, as it is dominant and owned by the incumbent banks; only 
clearing banks could issue electronic money (Competition Commission of South 
Africa, 2008, p. 478).
To remedy this, the Panel recommended that: Non-bank providers should be allowed 
to participate in clearing and settlement activities in low value and retail payment 
streams; the membership and governance of PASA should be revised to include non-
bank participants, with objective entry criteria and formal reporting to the National 
Payment System Department of the Reserve Bank; the creation of a Payment System 
Ombud to ensure fair treatment of all participations in terms of access and pricing 
(Competition Commission of South Africa, 2008, p. 471). 
Some changes have been implemented to improve the governance of the payments 
system (interview with PASA, 22 July 2015). The Council of the Payments 
Association of South Africa (PASA) now has an independent chairperson, who is 
not affiliated to any bank. The representatives of the banks owe a fiduciary duty to 
PASA and no longer represent a mandate from the banks that employ them. Non-
banks can be designated to become members of the payment system’s self-regulatory 
body, PASA.
The partial and ongoing implementation of the Banking Enquiry Panel’s 
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recommendations improved the competitive environment for retail banking. Capitec 
executives also note that the promulgation of the National Credit Act, No. 34 of 
2005 created certainty in the unsecured lending segment (interview with Capitec, 
10 November 2015). This meant that lenders in the unsecured segment had clear 
legislation and regulations to comply with, instead of operating under an exemption 
from the Usury Act that could be withdrawn at any time. The exemption had also 
restricted lenders to loans of up to ZAR10,000 and repayment terms of up to 36 
months. With the National Credit Act, these restrictions fell away. This allowed for 
the emergence of a clearly regulated environment, where institutions with capabilities 
in lending on the strength of affordability assessments could develop their businesses. 
With higher loan amounts and longer repayment terms, unsecured lenders were also 
able to capture middle class clients.
3. The Capitec case study, 2001-2015
Mode of entry into banking
Capitec registered as a bank in 2001 during the “small banks crisis”,6 which was 
undermining consumer and investor confidence in the sector. The crisis that unfolded 
from 1999 to around 2002 saw a number of small banks failing. These bank failures 
include Regal Treasury Bank,7 Saambou8 and BOE.9 The business that became 
Capitec was formed through the acquisition of a number of micro-lending businesses 
by PSG Investment Bank. At the time, there were many individually owned micro-
lending entities, many of them run by civil servants who had cashed out their pensions 
after the democratic transition (interview with Capitec, 10 November 2015). The 
personal loan market was under-developed at the time. Lending consisted mainly 
of secured loans, in addition to loans extended by furniture and other retailers. The 
PSG move was an attempt to consolidate a few players to create the platform for a 
retail bank. From the beginning, the aspiration was to be a mass bank covering all 
individuals with a regular income.
Significant acquisitions by PSG in micro-lending include SmartFin and Finaid,10 
which were bought in 1997. These acquisitions gave PSG a branch network across 
6  Largely caused by the liquidity crisis of 1992 which can be traced to the South-East Asian financial 
crisis of 1997, the concomitant banking crisis as well as the Russian financial crisis of 1998.
7  The run on Regal Bank is said to be the result of external auditors rescinding their approval of 
the financial statements of the bank’s controlling company in 2001. This led to an outflow of funds 
creating a liquidity crisis. The bank was placed under curatorship on 26 June 2001 (South African 
Reserve Bank, 2002).
8  Saambou’s demise was due to losses in its microfinance activities. It was the seventh largest bank at 
the time.
9  BOE faced a run by its wholesale depositors. National Treasury guaranteed that it would fund 
withdrawals from the bank as a measure to restore confidence. The bank was ultimately acquired by 
Nedbank.
10  Finaid offered pay-day loans.
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the country. Finaid had 300 branches and only one product: 30-day loans charging 
30% interest per month (Ashton, 2012). These micro-lending branches were steadily 
converted into banking branches, at significant cost, to form the basis of what would 
become Capitec Bank.
The PSG Group had two banking licences at the time of the formation of Capitec, 
one from The Business Bank and another for PSG Investment Bank (interview with 
PSG, Stellenbosch, 2015).  The Business Bank’s licence was transferred to Capitec 
Bank Holdings on March 2001. Capitec listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
on 18 February 2002. Though Capitec was built on a set of acquisitions in its early 
days, it has experienced organic growth since then. Capitec grew quite slowly initially 
as illustrated in Figure 2 below. The number of branches initially declined between 
2003 and 2005. However, its growth in terms of branches and clients accelerated 
significantly from about 2008 onwards, with the number of branches increasing 
from 363 in 2008 to 629 in 2014, and the number of clients from 1.1 million to 
5.4 million. By February 2015, Capitec had over 6.2 million active clients. This 
represents a 16% increase from February 2014. According to Moody’s, 2.8 million of 
these clients deposited salaries and made payments from their Capitec account, using 
it as primary bank account (Moody’s, 2015).
Figure 2: Capitec number of branches and clients, 2003-2014
Source: Capitec (2003-2015)
Capitec’s growth has been particularly strong in the low-income market. Figure 3 
below illustrates Capitec’s market share by living standard measure (LSM) band for 
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the period 2011 to 2013. It shows that Capitec’s market share grew strongly in all 
the bands, but particularly in LSMs 5 and 6 where, by 2013, it had 17.8% and 16.5% 
market share respectively. Capitec executives attribute the bank’s apparent growth 
acceleration from 2008 to regulatory developments, funding and internal initiatives 
(interview with Capitec, 10 November 2015). The National Credit Act provided 
the legal and regulatory framework that allowed the bank to extend loan terms. As 
capital restraints on lending were done away with (only the interest rate limitation 
was left after the Usury Act was repealed), the bank’s loan book grew. Regulatory 
certainty allowed the market to develop. Funding lines also became available and 
Capitec embarked on its debt-raising note programme. Finally, initiatives to improve 
branches, systems and people matured, which allowed the bank to increase its fee 
income.
Figure 3: Capitec market share by living standard measure (LSM) band
Source: Capitec (2014), based on All Media and Products Study (AMPS) data
Looking at market shares for retail household deposits, however, it is clear that 
although Capitec’s market share has grown strongly, it is still very small compared to 
the four major banks, at less than 5% in 2013 (see Figure 1 above). This performance 
does not rule out the possibility that there may still be barriers to growth and 
expansion in the market. This view ties in with the findings of a recent banking 
enquiry review, which found that, since the banking enquiry of 2008, newer entrants 
have increased their share of total deposits, but the retail banking market remains 
relatively small (Hawthorne et al., 2014). Capitec’s transactional fee income reflects 
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this.  As a percentage of Capitec’s operating income before impairments, transactional 
fee income rose from 13% in 2008 to 22% in 2015, while for the big four banks, the 
ratio has ranged from 29% to 39% over the nine year period 2006-2015 (see Figure 
4 below). 
Figure 4: Net fee and commission income as a percentage of revenue before impairments
Source: Bank annual reports; Hawthorne et al. (2014) 
Note: Net revenues used for ABSA, First National Bank (FNB), Nedbank and Standard Bank, gross 
revenues used for Capitec based on data availability. Though gross revenues are used for Capitec, its 
proportion of transaction fees is still lower than that of the other banks.
Sources of f inance
Main sources of funding
Various sources of finance have been utilised by Capitec since its inception. In the 
early period between 2001 and 2003, the company was mainly financed by equity, 
which represented more than 80% of long term financing at the end of the 2003 
financial year. Debt instruments were first utilised in 2004, while deposits became a 
significant source of finance between 2007 and 2008.  The bank raised debt funding 
against future growth from European development finance institutions. Discussions 
about raising debt funding were lengthy and difficult (interview with Capitec, 10 
November 2015). The remaining sources of finance utilised over time are depicted in 
the graph in Figure 5 below.
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Figure 5: Sources of finance, 2002-2015
Source: Capitec (2003-2015)
Share capital and other components of equity
Financing remains one of the biggest challenges for new entrants in the banking 
sector. Capitec struggled to raise financing in the early years. For the greater part 
of the infant years, the company was self-funded and significant portions of profit 
were retained by the entity. The bank started off with one-month loans, in order to 
quickly recoup capital and make profit, so that this could be reinvested. As a result, 
on average, 71% of profits were reinvested into the entity between 2002 and 2007, 
while the highest retention rates of 100% and 99.1% were recorded in 2002 and 2004 
respectively (Capitec, 2003-2008). The partnership with PSG played a pivotal role in 
ensuring the survival of the entity, specifically in the early days when other investors 
were sceptical about investing in Capitec (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Capitec’s shareholding as at 28 February 2003
Source: Capitec (2003)
Capitec’s reputation grew over time and investors’ confidence started to increase, 
which enabled Capitec to raise more capital.  During the 2007 financial year, Cap-
itec issued 10 million shares that increased the share capital by 86%. There were 
also share issuances in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, which raised ZAR1.2 billion, 
ZAR1.007 billion, ZAR2.4 billion, ZAR136 million respectively. Figure 7 below 
shows the movement in Capitec’s share capital over the years 2002-2015
Figure 7: Growth of Capitec’s share capital 2002-2015
Source: Capitec (2003-2015)
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Long-term loans and deposits
Capitec Bank adopted a conservative approach towards the utilisation of debt 
financing. The bank first took on debt instruments in 2004. After 2007, negotiable 
instruments and the domestic medium term note were the two main sources of 
debt instruments, while subordinated and senior bonds were issued during the 2015 
financial year. Despite emphasis on conservatism, Capitec also attributes the low levels 
of debt funding partly to the inaccessibility of debt markets for small companies.  In 
the early years, Capitec could not issue investment grade debt instruments, because 
they were a small organisation with no track record, hence they were limited to 
specialist financiers, such as development finance organisations (interview with 
Capitec, 10 November 2015). Capitec’s level of debt within the capital structure has 
improved over the years, however, it is still very low, relative to the industry average 
and the other five banks (Figure 8).
Figure 8: Capitec’s capital structure relative to other banks
Source: Annual reports of ABSA (2003-2015), Capitec (2003-2015), FirstRand Group (2003-2015), 
Investec (2003-2015), Standard Bank Group (2003-2015).
Capitec’s lack of access to debt financing, especially in the early years, did not only 
impact the ability to expand the entity’s operations, but also affected the entity’s 
profitability, as a result of a low financial leverage. The passage of the National Credit 
Act No. 34 of 2005 brought some relief, as the bank issued bigger loans with a term 
longer than 36 months, allowing for leverage.
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4. Capitec’s competitive strategy
Target market and customer acquisition strategy
In line with its ambition to become a retail bank for the mass market, particularly 
low-income households and the unbanked, Capitec branched into deposit-taking 
and payments, despite its origins as a micro-lending institution. The Capitec Group 
describes its focus as providing “retail banking services to all individuals based on 
the principles of simplicity, affordability, accessibility and personal service” (Capitec, 
2008). The large unbanked and “badly banked” population in South Africa presented 
a significant market opportunity, as, in 2004, only 45% of the population was 
considered to be banked (FinMark Trust, 2013).
During Capitec’s early years, the banking industry introduced the Mzansi account 
for the unbanked. The incumbents also introduced products and services aimed at 
the low income/low revenue end of the market. These included FNB’s roll-out of 
mobile branches, Pick ‘n Pay’s Go Banking partnership with Nedbank and Standard 
Bank’s branchless banking. Capitec did not participate in the Mzansi initiative, but 
introduced its own attractive offering (interview with FinMark Trust, 17 June 2015). 
According to Capitec executives, the bank did not want to differentiate clients by 
income (interview with Capitec, 10 November 2015). They sought to establish a 
“single status” culture, without the stigma associated with an account for the poor. 
Incumbents spend a lot of time on market segmentation, and tailoring products to 
segment. Capitec offers simple products across all segments. This approach meant 
that the bank could benefit from economies of scale reaped by providing standardised 
products. The standardised approach also meant that the bank was able to use recent 
graduates and school leavers with just seven weeks of internal training. 
Historically, South African retail banking customers did not switch banks easily, 
partly because it was seen as a cumbersome process. Previously underserved, low-
income customers might also trust the big four banks more than new entrants, as 
the former had established brands and had built credibility over time. According to 
FinMark Trust (2014), banking customers have been more sophisticated. In the run-
up to the Finscope study, four million people switched banks (FinMark Trust, 2014). 
Banks have also become more transparent about charges, thus facilitating switching. 
Capitec has overcome some of the challenges to switching by making its prices and 
product structures simple and transparent. The customer’s entire banking relationship 
is managed through the Global One account. The bank’s electronic platform is built 
to give the customer visibility of their savings, credit and transactional history through 
one bank account. The bank’s executives emphasised that this is key to the Capitec 
value proposition (interview with Capitec, 10 November 2015. This simplicity, in an 
opaque industry, appears to be a key competitive advantage for Capitec. In effect, it 
has turned barriers to switching into an advantage, because what sets it apart most 
from other banks is its transparency. 
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Product design (low transaction fees, high rates on daily savings, low interest on loans)
In line with the “one status” culture mentioned above, the Global One account is 
available to all income segments. The high interest rates on positive balances are 
part of the affordability proposition to customers. This has not affected earnings 
negatively, as the bank has a low cost base (very low cost-to-income ratio by global 
standards) and has a high margin lending business. The main omissions in the 
offering are credit cards and overdrafts.
Though three of the four main incumbents did not initially see Capitec as a 
challenger, they have now responded with similar offerings (Capitec, 2015). These 
include FNB’s Easy Account and Smart Unlimited and ABSA’s Transact. Capitec 
offered the cheapest account until around 2012, see Figure 9 below. According to 
Solidarity Research Institute, ABSA’s Transact account and FNB’s Easy Account 
now compete strongly with Capitec (interview with Solidarity, 2 July 2015). A key 
element of the bank’s strategy is to locate its branches in places that are convenient 
to the consumer, for example commuter nodes such as taxi ranks. 
Figure 9: Lowest priced bank account (monthly fees)
Source: FinMark Trust (2014)
IT infrastructure and digital technology advances
Unlike its incumbent competitors, Capitec was not encumbered by a legacy IT 
system. Therefore, it could build custom IT infrastructure in line with current market 
needs. The bank could also consider newer, more advanced information technologies, 
as it could not afford a mainframe system. It settled on a core banking system used 
by banks worldwide, in particular banks in India that dealt with high volumes of 
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transactions. It also relied on the Windows platform, which is a low cost and scalable 
approach. There was no pressure for the bank to expand into its capacity, instead, it 
increased its capacity as needed. On the negative side, it had to import most of its IT 
requirements and customising for South African conditions was difficult (interview 
with Capitec, 10 November 2015). Capitec acknowledged, in interviews, that the 
IT requirements for starting a new bank are not insignificant. A retail bank needs 
the system, not only to provide services to their own clients, but to connect to other 
banks. Systems also have to be customised for legislation. 
The cost of building a new IT system was not a significant constraint on cash flow, 
as the bank could start small. The systems were available within a reasonable time, as 
their IT service providers were also minor players at the time. Now that these service 
providers have been acquired by larger technology companies, their systems are 
more expensive. The IT systems enabled Capitec to build their services around the 
customer. Whereas traditional banks have silos, i.e., a cheque system, a card system, 
other, Capitec built the various components into one core client-centric system.
Incumbent banks may have developed advanced digital platforms to cater to affluent 
customers. Capitec deployed its technological capabilities to serve the mass market. 
It built a business model based on efficient and customer-friendly branches, enabled 
by the utilisation of queue management systems, digital signatures, biometric and 
photographic identification, and the digital storage of supporting documentation, 
amongst other technology uses (Capitec, 2015, p. 23). This improved the customer 
experience and lowered the cost of servicing its market, which the incumbent banks 
considered to be expensive. The ease of transacting supported Capitec’s efforts to 
convert the previously unbanked to become active users of their accounts, in contrast 
to the outcomes of the Mzansi initiative, which saw many accounts lying dormant 
(interview with FinMark Trust, 17 June 2015). 
Digitally-mediated payment channels: ATM network and cash-back at point of sale
Access to cash is important to the low- and middle-income customer base that 
Capitec competes for. In general, an ATM network is a significant competitive feature 
in the market for deposit-taking. For small banks with a limited ATM network, the 
chances are that their customers would withdraw money from other banks’ ATMs 
– off-us transactions – attracting interchange fees from incumbents. The Banking 
Enquiry found that off-us ATM charges were quite high in South Africa. The mark-
up by a customer’s own bank was also much higher than the interchange it pays 
on the transaction. For the reasons above, it was important for Capitec to roll out 
infrastructure for its customers to withdraw cash. Its branches did not handle cash, 
but customers had access to ATM machines co-located at branches. The location of 
Capitec’s ATMs and customer’s transaction behaviour (a few major withdrawals per 
month) will have alleviated demand for cash at rivals’ ATMs.
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Another cheap way for consumers to access cash is to withdraw at retail points 
of sale (cash-back at till). When Capitec enabled customers to receive cash-back 
at tills in 2005, it was still an under-utilised service in South Africa. This was an 
attempt by Capitec to save on ATM costs. It was also a secure option for customers. 
Furthermore, the retailer benefitted as it allowed it to move cash, which is costly 
to manage and transfer by road. Members of Capitec’s executive team were able 
to tap into relationships they had with retailers from their time at Distillers and at 
Boland Bank to effect this digital and process innovation (interview with Capitec, 10 
November 2015). At the time, most banks could not process cash back transactions. 
Initially, Capitec had a direct line at Pick n Pay. It got an exemption from PASA 
to “sort at source” for cash back at point-of sale.11 According to the Reserve Bank, 
this allowed the bank to continue with its business, whilst others got their house in 
order (interview with South African Reserve Bank, 8 October 2015). Other banks 
appealed this exemption. It can thus be deduced that banks used the appeals process 
to block innovation, or to buy time for winning back their competitiveness.
Cash-back at till transactions have not had mass take-up, with low volumes transacted. 
Only 4% of customers use this instrument, compared to 78% using ATMs. Capitec 
is of the view that fees are not the barrier to greater take-up. Cash back fees are 
lower than those for ATM withdrawals. The main challenge is likely to be how 
customers have been socialised into using ATMs for cash withdrawal. Campaigns to 
create awareness and encourage behavioural change could increase utilisation of this 
digitally-mediated payment channel (interview with Capitec, 10 November 2015).
Skills and capabilities
Though Capitec was established by an investment bank, it soon acquired executives 
with retail and banking experience, with key personnel having worked at Boland 
Bank, Board of Executors Bank and Distell. These executives had experience in 
banking, but also in operating in low-income communities. It is interesting to note 
that the banking institutions that the executives were previously involved with and 
other banks that had been taken over by PSG, such as The Business Bank and 
Real Africa Durolink, had encountered difficulty if not outright failure. Hence, the 
executive team came to the Capitec experience with cautionary tales that would have 
prepared them for building this bank. This is likely to have informed the deliberate 
and conservative approach to expansion and financing taken by the bank in its early 
days (interview with PSG, 2015). Some key IT appointments were made early on. 
11  A customer who wanted cash back at the till would have their transaction processed directly to 
Capitec Bank, even though Pick n Pay had another bank acquiring transactions at its tills. Sorting 
at source allows the merchant to choose which bank they will use to complete a transaction. Hence 
it allows for bilateral transactions that do not have to be cleared and settled in the interbank system. 
If all merchants were able to sort at source, in the extreme case, there would be little need for the 
interbank system.
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Luck played a part too, with the shut-down of an IT division belonging to another
company in Paarl, making it possible for Capitec to pick their best employees.
The take-off in branches and operations
Capitec experienced a pick-up in the number of customers around 2008. Its 
executives gave a number of reasons for this: The National Credit Act formalised 
the legal and regulatory framework to extend the terms of loans. The capital restraint 
fell away, with only interest rate limitations remaining. The loan book grew on the 
back of regulatory certainty. Funding lines became more open. The bank embarked 
on its note programme in 2008. Its internal initiatives on branch expansion, and 
systems and people development, began to pay off, leading to the growth of fee 
income. The bank survived the vulnerable period when it could have been bought 
out (interview with Capitec, 10 November 2015). However, the larger banks began to 
imitate Capitec’s branch physical layout, advertising messages, switching service and
opening hours. As Solidarity Research Institute (2010-2014) reports demonstrate, 
there was a heightened focus on pricing.
5. Payment system regulation and entry into banking
To offer banking products to their clients, banks have to enter into inter-bank 
arrangements to facilitate payments between customers across the banking sector. 
Payment instructions are exchanged (cleared) and then settled through Bankserv 
daily and the Reserve Bank’s Real Time Gross Settlement system immediately. The 
payments system is built on the principles of process and IT interoperability and 
stability. Banks have to ensure that they are able to process the instruments provided 
by other banks and that their products also meet agreed-upon specifications. The 
various types of payment instruments (cheque, electronic funds transfer) are organised 
as payment clearing houses (PCHs). Each PCH is made up of member banks that 
offer that service (interview with PASA, 22 July 2015). The member banks devise the 
rules and modalities of the PCH, which are approved by the PASA Council. Non-
compliance with PASA rules attracts financial penalties.
According to PASA, the main risks within the payment system stem from its 
interconnectedness, while the failure of one institution can lead to the failure of 
others (interview with PASA, 22 July 2015). The settlement system represents the 
biggest concentration of risk. It is common for this area to be reserved for banks, as 
the banking regulator can enforce collateral requirements against them. Any non-
bank wanting to operate in this field should become a bank, PASA argues, as this 
would be an easy way to monitor collateral and capital adequacy. Non-banks could 
enter as “designated” member, exempt from banking licence. In this way, they can 
participate in clearing, but not settlement.
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Capitec’s experience in entering and participating in the payments system
According to Capitec (interview with Capitec, 10 November 2015), entry into the 
payments system was not difficult. In line with PASA’s rules, Capitec found a mentor 
bank to ease it into the various payment clearing houses. ABSA performed that role. 
The fees that are charged for these arrangements are likely to be high by international 
standards (interview with PASA, 22 July 2015). Sponsorship fees are based on values 
and volumes. There are no guidelines for sponsorship and mentoring arrangements. 
In PASA’s view, entrants can shop around for the best arrangement and PASA was 
not aware of a situation where a new entrant has not been able to secure a sponsor. 
PASA was not aware of any rejections to requests to join the body. However, PASA 
has no direct influence over negotiations between mentors and mentee banks.
As a new bank unburdened by legacy systems, Capitec was able to introduce new 
ways of doing business, like moving away from fax notification for EFT disputes. 
Capitec was the first to issue a debit MasterCard (as opposed to a Maestro card), 
which came with a transaction processing methodology12 that was typically used for 
credit card transactions. Initially, some banks did not process the messaging properly. 
Capitec had to wait for the other banks to develop the capability to process payments 
from the card. To move unilaterally would have meant a poor customer experience for 
those holding the card, as it would be declined at merchants who use card acceptance 
facilities provided by the incumbent banks.  This meant a significant delay in roll-out 
of the Mastercard offering (interview with Capitec, 10 November 2015).
To introduce a new financial instrument depends on the pace of the slowest acquirer. 
The Banking Enquiry Panel Report argued that introducing innovation is beset 
by two main challenges: (i) gaining permission from the incumbent to introduce 
the development in a payment clearing house, and (ii) negotiating inter-bank fees. 
The report argues that innovation could meet resistance from incumbents who feel 
threatened and may expose the innovator’s intellectual property. When it was put to 
PASA that new developments may be thwarted in this way, the Association countered 
that this is no longer a significant issue. Furthermore, PASA imposes penalties for 
breaches of its rules on interoperability. 
A note on other entry episodes into retail banking
Capitec entered the retail banking market largely through internal financing. Since 
2008, Capitec has grown into one of the top six banks in the country, however, this 
is a relatively unique success story in South Africa. Other small banks and recent 
entrants show a contrast with Capitec’s experiences. 
12  A dual messaging system. In a single messaging system, authorisation of the transaction and 
clearing occur simultaneously for each transaction, but in a dual system, clearing is done in batches. 
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Ubank, formerly known as Teba Bank, was established to provide financial services 
to mineworkers in the 1960s, through facilitating the distribution of salaries to the 
mines, before becoming a deposit-taking institution in the 1980s. In an attempt to 
develop a customer base outside the mining industry, it rebranded itself as Ubank in 
2010. It could be argued that Ubank should have been the front-runner in banking 
the low-income, unbanked market, given its decades of experience in providing basic 
banking services to mineworkers and running a remittance system between mining 
and “labour-sending” areas. Yet, its forays into the general population have not been 
successful to date, largely as a result of lack of financing.
The bank does not have a “shareholder of reference” as it is owned by a trust, 
whose beneficiaries are miners represented by the majority trade union, currently 
the National Union of Mineworkers, and the Chamber of Mines. Its Tier I capital 
comprises solely of retained earnings and it has no debt on its balance sheet. The 
bank has engaged a range of investors with limited success and it faces a challenge in 
accessing debt, as it does not have a credit rating. Ubank’s struggle with raising Tier 1 
capital is not unique, as other small banks such as Ithala, Sasfin and the former Abil 
also experienced problems, reliant mostly on bonds. Without a significant capital 
injection and a revitalised business strategy (which Ubank claims to have, but which 
is hampered by lack of capital), it is difficult to see Ubank emerging as a competitive 
force to challenge the big four and Capitec.
Mercantile Bank is another small bank, which has been operating in South Africa for 
50 years. It started out as the Bank of Lisbon, with a focus on the Portuguese-South 
African consumer market. In 1996 it became known as Mercantile Lisbon Bank, 
after a merger with Mercantile, a non-banking financial institution. In 2005, the 
bank changed its name to Mercantile Bank. After a period of weak performance, the 
bank was restructured, with a new core focus on commercial and business banking. 
It still relied on cheap deposits from retail clients, which were lent out into segments 
such as commercial property. Currently the bank focuses on attracting entrepreneurs 
to its bank, a segment it believes is badly served by the banking industry.
As a wholly owned subsidiary, Mercantile’s experience with access to finance is 
largely determined by the standing of its Portuguese parent, which does not enjoy a 
robust credit rating. The key area of difficulty identified by Mercantile is the cost of 
compliance with regulatory changes. Some of these changes are justified, but prove to 
be a disproportionate burden on smaller banks. PASA penalties also hit small banks 
harder than larger banks, as they are imposed as flat rates (not turn-over based). From 
the bank’s comments, it appears that a more rigorous evaluation of the costs versus 
benefits of new regulation is needed.
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6. Analytical highlights
 
The benef its of entry
Capitec’s entry and growth in transactional banking sparked a competitive response 
from incumbents, especially FNB and ABSA. These banks now offer products that 
are positioned to compete with Capitec’s simple, information technology-driven and 
digitally-mediated, low cost offering. Across all four incumbent banks, the fees for 
low-cost accounts have come down in nominal terms. It is unlikely that these effects 
would have occurred if the status quo had continued without a disruptive entrant, or 
if Capitec had been acquired by one of the incumbents early on. Capitec introduced 
disruptive effects at the technology innovation layer and at the service layer.
The positive effects of Capitec’s entry are expressed in three ways: (i) new-to-banking 
customers that now have access to finance, (ii) lower bank charges for customers who 
switch from the incumbents to Capitec and (iii) lower prices from incumbents’ clients 
as their banks react to Capitec. This can be illustrated by the simple exercise below 
that shows the “savings” the latter two effects are likely to have had in the market.
Table 1: Lower prices for clients at incumbent banks
Bank Clients 2014 Price decrease (2010-2014) Savings
 ABSA 8,600,000 ZAR91.00 ZAR782,600,000
 FNB 7,600,000 ZAR16.00 ZAR121,600,000
 Nedbank 6,700,000 ZAR9.00 ZAR60,300,000
 Standard Bank 10,400,000 ZAR56.00 ZAR582,400,000
 Total Savings (monthly) ZAR1,546,900,000
 Total Savings (annual) ZAR18,562,800,000
Source: BusinessTech (2015) (number of clients); Solidarity Research Institute (2010-2014)
If, in 2014, customers on the lowest cost accounts at incumbent banks had been 
charged the same prices as in 2010, they would have paid ZAR1.55 billion more per 
month.13 
13  This is not, strictly speaking, the actual savings by customers as the client base in 2014 includes 
new to banking customers attracted by lower prices.
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Table 2: Lower prices for clients who switched from incumbents to Capitec
Bank
Average price - lowest 
cost account (2010 
-2014) Weighted market share Weighted average price
ABSA ZAR101.40 29% ZAR29.41
Standard Bank ZAR100.20 24% ZAR24.05
Nedbank ZAR98 22% ZAR21.56
FNB ZAR60.20 24% ZAR14.45
Weighted average price – 
big four banks (2010-2014) ZAR89.46
Average Capitec price 
2010-2014 ZAR53.60
Difference ZAR35.86
Number of clients who switched (as-
sumed 75% of new Capitec clients) 2,449,500
Monthly savings for clients who 
switched ZAR87,843,969
Annual savings for clients who switched ZAR1,054,127,628
Source: Using data from Table 1 above
Customers who switched from any of the big four banks to Capitec between 2010 
and 2014 would have paid, on average, ZAR35.86 less per month in banking charges 
upon joining Capitec. This gives total savings of ZAR87.8 million per month or 
ZAR1.05 billion for the year 2014. This is an estimate, as some clients would have 
switched from a more expensive account, not necessarily the cheapest alternative of 
any of the big four banks. The figures are also distorted by the presence of multi-
banked clients. For the two groups of beneficiaries (switchers to Capitec and those 
enjoying price decreases at incumbent banks), this brings estimated annual savings 
in 2014, compared to 2010, to ZAR19.6 billion. This figure is driven by the fall 
in bank charges at the big four banks. While this is an estimate, it indicates the 
order of magnitude of the benefits accruing to mass market consumers from a more 
competitive retail banking market. The presence and behaviour of Capitec does not 
fully account for why banking charges fell since 2010, but is a significant factor in 
increasing competitive intensity in the mass market. 
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Table 3: Total savings14
Category of savers Annual amount saved
Clients at incumbent banks ZAR18,562,800,000
Clients that switched to Capitec ZAR1,054,127,628
Total annual savings ZAR19,616,927,628
The exception that proves the rule?
In some ways, Capitec’s experience is exceptional. In an interview with Moody’s 
(2015), the rating agency’s analysts could not think of a similar bank anywhere in 
the world. It has surged ahead of early attempts to bank the excluded, such as Ubank 
(former Teba Bank) and the Mzansi initiative. Its early financial backer chose to go 
into banking, precisely because of the high barriers to entry in that sector. Capitec 
overcame customers’ reluctance to switch, a key barrier to entry in retail banking, by 
developing a simple product that is easily understood. It also worked deliberately 
to convert its lending clients into transactional service clients. Some of the bank’s 
executives, having banking experience, were familiar with the payments system. 
However, it is clear that the ability of a small, nimble bank to introduce changes 
in this environment is subject to the incumbents’ willingness to change, as well as 
a rapid pace of change. This is a consequence of digital technology and process 
interoperability.
Capitec a benef iciary of regulatory changes in the industry
The competitive environment for Capitec was enhanced by regulatory and policy 
changes that sought to make the playing field more open and more level. The Banking 
Enquiry Panel Report focused attention on retail banking and heightened awareness 
about competitive behaviour in the sector. The partial and ongoing implementation 
of its recommendations improved the competitive environment for Capitec. The 
bank’s executives also emphasised the formalisation of the National Credit Act as 
a measure that created certainty in the unsecured lending segment, allowing the 
bank to operate effectively in that space. The regulatory regime governing retail 
banking supports the adoption of a wide range of digital technology. However, in 
the payments sphere, the self-regulatory mechanism may slow down the pace of 
technology adoption. As mentioned earlier, payment instruments are most valuable 
to the customer if they have universal acceptance. Yet, there is little in the regulatory 
environment that encourages laggards to adopt or adapt to innovations introduced 
by disruptors.
14  Though Capitec would not be drawn on a specific figure, it indicated that in recent times, the 
profile of its clients has changed. With more mid-market customers, it is likely that the majority of its 
new clients were previously banked. However, even if only 50% of new clients were previously banked, 
the overall savings for banking clients would come down from ZAR19.6 billion (calculated at 75%) to 
ZAR19.26 billion per year.
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7. Conclusion: Going forward
The Capitec case study analysed here confirms the significance of entry barriers 
identified in the literature. The duration required for Capitec to build its business, 
to the point where it was able to challenge incumbents, highlights the magnitude of 
these barriers. From its establishment in 2002, it grew slowly, mainly due to limited 
funding and a narrow branch network (although this is likely to be less so for future 
entrants given technology changes). The experience of other small banks, like UBank, 
further reinforced the significance of access to finance and regulatory challenges, 
which have limited UBank’s growth since 1994. The article also highlighted the 
benefits of entry and the resultant competition in the retail banking sector.
The study demonstrates that Capitec’s entry into the industry resulted in significantly 
lower bank charges, which are conservatively estimated at annual client savings of 
ZAR19.6 billion in 2014. Furthermore Capitec’s entry also sparked competition in 
low cost bank accounts, a development that resulted in established banks offering 
products that mimicked Capitec’s Global One account. This facilitated better services 
for the low-income clients and enhanced financial inclusion.  
However, there are certain areas that can still be improved to facilitate entry and 
the proliferation of small banks. One of these key areas is the switching process. 
This could be could be improved by instituting a regulated process with mandatory 
timelines, as suggested by the Banking Enquiry Panel 2008. The incoming ISO 
20022 messaging standard makes provision for automated debit order and incoming 
(salary) payment switching. With the system having better information on debit 
order originators, switching will become easier. The South African Reserve Bank 
should consider a process where consumers are not liable for interest, penalty fees and 
other charges incurred due to delays in switching bank accounts (Hawthorne et al., 
2014). The sharing of FICA information, with clear guidelines on where liability lies 
in the case of contraventions (the original or second bank), would also ease switching. 
A stricter process to ensure that participants adopt and facilitate innovation, in 
particular further digital innovation, new instruments and other changes is called for. 
Regulators can play an active role in facilitating innovation. In the UK, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) has an innovation hub. The support offered to new 
and established, regulated and unregulated financial business includes: a dedicated 
support team; help to innovator businesses to understand the regulatory framework 
and how it applies to them; assistance in preparing and making an application 
for authorisation; and a dedicated contact person for a year after an innovator is 
authorised to conduct business (FCA, 2015). Potential innovators bring ideas to the 
regulator, not necessarily complete applications, and also their concerns about how 
the current regulatory framework limits them. 
Capitec had aspirations to become a fully-fledged bank, but digital technology and 
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business model innovations have expanded the range of institutions that can offer 
transactional banking services. A tiered banking licensing regime could facilitate 
other modes of entry in the future. Both the National Treasury and the Reserve 
Bank support the development of a tiered banking licensing and regulatory regime.
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